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Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3G).

Issues Presented for Review
1.

Did the trial court correctly apply Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) in

determining that it lacked jurisdiction given Plaintiffs failure to exhaust
administrative remedies? The trial court's jurisdiction presents a question of law,
which this Court reviews for correctness. See, e.g.. National Advertising Co. v.
Murray City Corp.. 2006 UT App 75,1f11, 131 P.3d 872.
2.

Alternatively, did the trial court correctly apply the doctrine of laches

in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant? The trial court's
application of the doctrine of laches is a question of fact which this Court reviews
for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugar House
Shopping Center Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).
Both issues were originally raised in Wilkinson's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment filed with the trial court on December 1, 2005. (R. at 186215.)

Determinative Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-128
(1) Anyone may apply to the division for a certificate of existence for a domestic
corporation, a certificate of authorization for a foreign corporation, or a certificate
that sets forth any facts of record in the office of the division.
(2) A certificate of existence or authorization sets forth:
(a) the domestic corporation's corporate name or the foreign corporation's
corporate name registered in this state;
(b) that:
(i) the domestic corporation is duly incorporated under the law of this state and
the date of its incorporation; or
(ii) the foreign corporation is authorized to transact business in this state;
(c) that all fees, taxes, and penalties owed to this state have been paid, if:
(i) payment is reflected in the records of the division; and
(ii) nonpayment affects the existence or authorization of the domestic or foreign
corporation;
(d) that its most recent annual report required by Section 16-10a-1607 has been
filed by the division;
(e) that articles of dissolution have not been filed; and
(f) other facts of record in the office of the division that may be requested by the
applicant.
(3) Subject to any qualification stated in the certificate, a certificate issued by the
division may be relied upon as conclusive evidence of the facts set forth in the
certificate.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if
this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
2

(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is
issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.

Nature of the Case
This case is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Defendant Wilkinson Farm Services Company, ("Wilkinson.") The
district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction in this matter, or that
in the alternative, Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of laches.

Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this matter on August 25, 2003. (R. at 001003.) The Division of Corporations of the Utah Department of Commerce, ("the
Division,") was later joined and dismissed as a party to the action. (R. at 02932, 107-112.) A subsequent Third Party Complaint was filed against the
Division, which the trial court dismissed. (R. at 113-18, 165-67.) On November
10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 168-185.) On
December 1, 2005, Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment. (R.
at 186-215.) Following oral arguments on the matter, the district court granted

Defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. (R. at 244-46.) Plaintiff timely appealed therefrom. (R. at
247-48.)

Statement of Facts1
On November 18,1927, Wilkinson, originally known as Wilkinson-Shupe
Implement Company was formed by the execution of Articles of Incorporation.
(R. at 198-204.) Under Article IV of those articles, Wilkinson's corporate
duration was set at 50 years. (R. at 198.) Nevertheless, Wilkinson never
ceased to do business when its duration expired. Wilkinson continued to file
annual reports with the Division, which were accepted. (R. at 185.)
S.C. Wilkinson was an original incorporator of Wilkinson in 1927 and
served as its president from its inception. (R. at 207.) Beginning in 1974, and
at the time the 50 year charter period expired in 1977, LaVaun Terry actively
served as an officer of Wilkinson. (R. at 207.) While the parties were not in
agreement in their summary judgment briefing as to how many shares were
owned by LaVaun Terry, the evidence was undisputed that in 1982, LaVaun
Terry acquired shares in Wilkinson.2 (R. at 207, 210.) LaVaun Terry acquired
these shares from S.C. Wilkinson. (R. at 207.) Upon her passing in 2002,
1

In his brief, Plaintiff makes no citations to the record in support of any of his Statement of
Facts, notwithstanding the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). To the extent Plaintiff
relies on facts not included in the record to support his appellate claims, the Statement of Facts
should be stricken.
2
Ultimately, the only evidence supporting Plaintiff's contention was an affidavit stricken on
hearsay grounds.
4

Plaintiff inherited one share in Wilkinson from LaVaun Terry, who was the
Plaintiff's mother. (R. at 207.)
In 2003, Plaintiff complained to the Division in an attempt to have
Wilkinson's business shut down. On March 14, 2003, the Division responded by
inviting Wilkinson to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect a perpetual
duration. (R. at 022.) On April 7, 2003, in response to the Division's action,
Plaintiff, through his counsel again objected to Wilkinson's continuing operation
by correspondence to the Division's Director. (R. at 024-25.) On April 14, 2003,
Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles of Corporation to modify its
existence to perpetual, consistent with the Division's invitation. By letter of April
22, 2003, the Division advised Plaintiff that it had accepted and filed the
amended articles. (R. at 185.) The Division has issued Wilkinson a Certificate
of Existence, which reflects Wilkinson's good standing with the Division. (R. at
212.) In response to the Division's action, Plaintiff took no steps to
administratively appeal the Division's actions, either with the Division, or with the
Department of Commerce. Plaintiff filed this suit on August 25, 2003, seeking
declaratory relief. (R. at 001-03.)

Summary of Arguments
The trial court properly concluded that it was devoid of jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. Plaintiff failed to
exhaust administrative remedies after the Division took conclusive action in

inviting Defendant to renew and subsequently accepting Defendant's corporate
charter. Having failed to exhaust, Plaintiff's action was barred. Alternatively,
even if the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's claims, it did not
abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to Defendant based on the
doctrine of laches.

Argument
I.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Given His Failure To Exhaust
Administrative Remedies.
Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief against Wilkinson cannot stand

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Legislature has
empowered the Division to make conclusive determinations as to a
corporation's status under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-128. This statute further
authorizes the Division to issue certificates of existence evidencing a
corporation's status. Any such certificate "may be relied upon as conclusive
evidence of the facts set forth in the certificate." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a128(3).
A party disagreeing with a determination of the Division has administrative
avenues of relief to pursue. Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-1, et seq. establishes
administrative procedures for parties seeking action by the Department of
Commerce or its sub-divisions. Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12 specifically
establishes procedures for parties who are dissatisfied with an order from the

6

agency. Likewise consistent with statutory requirements, Utah Admin. Code
R151-46b-14 precludes judicial review of Department of Commerce action by a
party who has not exhausted its administrative remedies.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, compliance with an agency's
procedures for review is mandatory. Indeed, "A party may seek judicial review
only after exhausting all administrative remedies available..." Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-14(2). This Court has stated, "The basic purpose underlying the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 'is to allow an administrative
agency to perform functions within its special competence - to make a factual
record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial
controversies.'" Maverik Countrv Stores. Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 860
P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Citations omitted.) Failure to comply with
the Administrative Procedures Act's exhaustion requirement deprives a
reviewing court of jurisdiction. ]d. at 947-48. See, also. Housing Authority of
County of Salt Lake v. Snvder. 2002 UT 28,1f11, 44 P.3d 724 (Where
exhaustion requirement is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction);
Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety. 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(Where exhaustion requirement is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't. of Corrections. 942 P.2d
933, 938-39 (Utah 1997)(res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to decisions
of administrative agencies and bar relitigation of issues a party fails to appeal by
way of judicial review).

In the case subjudice, there is no question that the Division has authority
to take administrative action in the case. Plaintiff acknowledges in his
memorandum that "the Division has initial, conclusive authority to determine
corporate status" and that "the Division also has exclusive authority to
administratively dissolve a corporation..." (Br. of Appellant at 8.)3
Notwithstanding this concession, Plaintiff then proceeds to ignore the
exhaustion requirement, which deprived the district court of jurisdiction, and
proceeds to a legal argument, which should have been raised and exhausted
with the Department of Commerce.
Plaintiff offers no suggestion that the exhaustion requirement does nox
apply to the facts of this matter, nor does it argue that any of the statutory or
judicially-created exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply. Having made
no attack on the fundamental basis for the trial court's grant of Wilkinson's
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's arguments as to how the provisions of
the Revised Business Corporations Act and caselaw should apply to the
underlying facts of this case are irrelevant. The district court's conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction should be affirmed.

3

Perhaps for this reason, Plaintiff was especially careful to keep the Division out of the lawsuit.
While it begrudgingly named the Division as a party after Wilkinson filed a Motion to Dismiss
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), it dismissed the Division shortly thereafter.
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II.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Properly Dismissed Under the Doctrine of
Laches.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Wilkinson's favor on

the issue of laches. The doctrine of laches has two elements in Utah. A
defendant must show that "(1) plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an
action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced by that delay." Nilson-Newev & Co.
v. Utah Resources Int'L 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In this case, in its motion for summary judgment, Wilkinson alleged the
following facts relative to the doctrine of laches: (1) S. C. Wilkinson was an
original incorporator and president of Wilkinson from its inception. (2) LaVaun
Terry inherited 6 shares in the Defendant company from S.C. Wilkinson in 1982.
(3) LaVaun Terry actively served as a corporate officer in Wilkinson beginning in
1974. (4) Plaintiff inherited 1 share in Wilkinson from his mother in 2002. (5)
Plaintiffs requested relief had the potential for far-reaching adverse tax
consequences to the company. (Affidavit of Lorraine Burdett, Exhibit A, and R. at
206-08.) (6) S.C. Wilkinson signed the articles of incorporation. (R. at 202.)
(7) Wilkinson never ceased doing business but continued to file annual reports
with the Division, which were accepted and never questioned. (R. at 185.)
Plaintiff did not dispute the facts as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B).
To the contrary, Plaintiff's memorandum opposing summary judgment merely
contained a brief paragraph disputing that LaVaun Terry had a predecessor in

interest for her shares in Wilkinson.4 Plaintiff also filed an affidavit, which was
stricken on hearsay grounds.5 Accordingly, there was no record evidence to
controvert any of the facts relied upon by Wilkinson, and which served as the
basis for the district court's finding of laches.
On appeal, this Court should not disturb the trial court's finding of laches
"unless it appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the decision cannot
reasonably be found to be supported by the evidence." Papanikolas Bros.
Enterprises. 535 P.2d at 1260. Likewise, whether the doctrine of laches will
apply can only be determined under the facts and circumstances of each unique
case. See. Mawhinnev v. Jensen. 232 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1951).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has not argued the existence of a single fact to
show that that the district court abused its discretion or was unsupported.
Instead, it argues that two points relied upon by the district court, underlying its
ultimate conclusion that there was unreasonable delay, are inconsistent. This is
an insufficient basis to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.
Plaintiffs reliance on Goodman v. Lee. 76 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996), is equally
uncompelling given the case by case evaluation required in applying the doctrine
of laches. Whereas in Goodman there was evidence that Plaintiffs were

4

In the undersigned's review of the Court record, it appears the Plaintiff's memorandum
opposing summary judgment has also been stricken or is missing. As a general rule, the
appellant bears the burden of ensuring a complete record. See, State v. Litherland. 2000 UT
76,1J17, 12 P.3d 92. Nevertheless, for ease of reference, a copy of the memorandum is
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5
Plaintiff has not challenged the district court's decision to strike the Affidavit of Donald Terry in
his memorandum.
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unaware of their cause of action, the district court in this case found based on the
evidence that the Plaintiffs predecessors knew or should have known of the facts
underlying the cause of action, and therefore the delay in bringing these claims
was unreasonable. (R. at 245.) This was amply supported by the summary
judgment evidence, which established that Plaintiffs predecessors in interest
either knew of the terms of the corporate charter (having signed it), or as officers
in the corporation, should have known of the circumstances surrounding the
corporate existence.
Plaintiff appears to argue that the district court decision cannot be
sustained solely because the district court concluded that Wilkinson believed it
had some sort of "de facto" existence. However, Plaintiff, argues no evidence on
appeal to undermine the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs predecessors
knew or should have known of the charter's expiration or that there was an
unreasonable delay in taking action. Nor does Plaintiff challenge the district
court's finding that Wilkinson was prejudiced by the delay. Absent a showing that
these findings, as to the elements of laches, constituted an abuse of the district
court's discretion, the district court's order should stand. Moreover, Plaintiff has
not presented this Court with any legal basis on appeal, which merits overturning
the district court's finding of laches.

Conclusion
This case centers in the complaints of the owner of a single shareholder in
Wilkinson with a vendetta against the family-owned corporation. In Plaintiff's zeal
to get a court determination shutting down the family business, Plaintiff deprived
the Court of jurisdiction in failing to exhaust his administrative remedies with the
Division and the Department of Commerce. In addition, Plaintiff has shown no
legal basis to call into question the district court's alternative finding of laches.
The district court was correct to grant summary judgment to Wilkinson on both of
these issues. Wilkinson respectfully requests that the district court be affirmed.
DATED this

\°j

day of March, 2007.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
By:
H. Thomas Stevenson
Benjamin C Rasmussen
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this

f "}

day of March, 2007,1 mailed two true

and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, postage prepaid, to the
following individuals:
Michael F. Olmstead
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, UT 84401

EXHIBIT A

H. Thomas Stevenson, No. 6803
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel.: (801) 399-9910
Fax: (801) 399-9954
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DONALD E. TERRY,

AFFIDAVIT OF LORRAINE BURDETT

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE
COMPANY and UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS &
COMMERCIAL CODE,
Civil No. 030906753

Defendants.
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE
COMPANY,

j Judge Michael D. Lyon

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, DIVISION OF
CORPORATIONS & COMMERCIAL
CODE,
Third Party Defendant.

1

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
ss.
)

COMES NOW Affiant, Lorraine Burdett, having been duly sworn, and deposes
and states as follows:
1.

My name is Lorraine Burdett. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. I
have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2.

I am the president of Wilkinson Farm Service Company. I have been a
shareholder in the company since prior to the 1960's.

3.

My father S.C. Wilkinson, was an incorporator of Wilkinson Farm Service
Company and its president from its inception in 1927.

4.

On November 30, 1982, LaVaun Terry received six shares in Wilkinson Farm
Service Company inherited from S.C. Wilkinson.

5.

In addition, LaVaun has served as an officer in the corporation. Tax returns
show that LaVaun was corporate vice president as early as 1974.

6.

In 2002, Plaintiff Donald Terry acquired 1 share in Wilkinson Farm Service
Company by inheritance from LaVaun Terry.

7.

Any judicial declaration that the corporation has not existed since 1977 has the
potential to impact the corporation's tax liability and require extensive
amendments to corporate tax returns.
Further Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this

day of December, 2005.

y^Lcs^J*^
Lorraine Burdett
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN this

JULIE S WILLIAMS
NOTARY PU8UC-SMTE0FUMH
3986 WASHINGTON BO/0
O G 0 E N , UT 8 4 4 0 3
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EXHIBIT B

MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD [2455]
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 625-0960
Facsimile (801)621-0035

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE
Plaintiff,
COMPANY'S CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
vs.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT WILKINSON
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY and
FARM SERVICE COMPANY'S
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS &
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
COMMERCIAL CODE,
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS
Defendants.
DONALD E. TERRY,

Civil No. 030906753
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS &
COMMERCIAL CODE,
Third-Party Defendant.

Judge MICHAEL D. LYON

Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on
the Pleadings
Civil No. 030906753

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings and
submitted a Memorandum in Support thereof.

Defendant WILKINSON FARM SERVICE

COMPANY (hereinafter "Wilkinson") has filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and
submitted a Memorandum in Support of its Cross Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiffs initial
Motion.

This Memorandum addresses the points raised in Wilkinson's Cross Motion and

Memorandum in Support thereof.
FACTS IN DISPUTE
Wilkinson, in its Memorandum in Support of its Cross Motion, recites facts (based on an
Affidavit filed by Lorraine Burdett) indicating that the one (1) share of stock (ownership interest)
inherited by Plaintiff was originally owned by S. C. Wilkinson.
Plaintiffs position is that the share of stock inherited from his mother, LaVaun Terry in 2001
was only one (1) of sixteen (16) shares she had received from the company in her own right. (See
Affidavit of Donald E. Terry attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and, by this reference, made a part of
this Memorandum.) In summary, Plaintiff claims the only predecessor-in-interest to his ownership
interest in the company was his mother, LaVaun Terry.
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT I
[STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS]
Wilkinson argues that Plaintiff is bound by the failure of his predecessors-in-interest to
2

Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on
the Pleadings
Civil No. 030906753

challenge Wilkinson's corporate status after November 1977, when its charter expired. Wilkinson
argues that, because Plaintiffs ancestors failed to challenge corporate status during the ensuing four
(4) years, any claim became forever barred.
Defendant's argument is based on the premise that, at the moment Wilkinson's charter
expired, a cause of action accrued, and it was incumbent at that time on Plaintiffs predecessors to
pursue an action similar to the one here taken by Plaintiff. The premise upon which this argument
is based is flawed because, first, it fails to recognize that Plaintiff is not making a claim against
Wilkinson but is simply seeking a judicial declaration of Wilkinson's corporate status, due to its
expired charter. It also ignores the fact that if, as Plaintiff claims, Wilkinson's existence as a
corporation ceased by operation of law after November 1977, then that status continues to the present
day. Wilkinson's status, as an expired corporation, doesn't change by mere passage of time. The
company's corporate existence cannot suddenly be resurrected after aperiod of four (4) years, simply
because no one questions that status. Plaintiff, in fact, had no standing to raise the question and seek
a declaration of status until he acquired his ownership interest through inheritance in 2001.
A proper analogy would be a "continuing trespass". As long as the wrong continues, each
new person affected by the wrong has a new cause of action. If Wilkinson ceased to be a corporation
after November 1977, that status continues forever, and Plaintiff has a right to have a judicial
declaration of that status at the moment he gains an ownership interest.
3

Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on
the Pleadings
Civil No. 030906753

Even assuming a statute-of-limitation analysis is applicable, the time does not begin to run
until "a cause of action has accrued". [Utah Code Annotated. §78-12-1.] In certain situations,
ignorance of the existence of cause of action will excuse inaction and prevent the running of the
limitations' period. [Maughan vs. S. W. Servicing. Inc., 1985,758 Fed. 2d 1381.] Under Utah law,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the Plaintiff knew, or, with due diligence, should have known,
of his cause of action and in exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust. [Allen vs. U. S.. 1984, 588 F. Supp., 247, Reversed 1816 F. 2d 1417,
Certiorari Denied, 108 S. Court, 694, 484 U. S. 1004, 98, Law Edition 2d 647.]
There are three (3) situations in which the so-called discovery rule applies: (1) When the
discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) when a Plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of
action because of Defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) when the case presents
exceptional circumstances, and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust,
regardless of any showing that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
[HOM vs. Utah Department of Public Safety, 1988,962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Advanced Reports 15.]
Plaintiff believes that an application of the discovery rule is proper in this case under, at least,
two (2) of the three (3) situations described above.
First, Plaintiff believes that the discovery rule is mandated by statute. Utah Code Annotated,
§78-12-26(3), provides for a three (3) year statute of limitations "for relief on the ground of fraud
4

Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to PlaintiffMotion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on
the Pleadings
Civil No. 030906753

or mistake; except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
agreed party of facts constituting fraud or mistake."
Plaintiff is not claiming fraud on Defendant's part but does claim mutual mistake on behalf
of both Plaintiff and Defendant Wilkinson as to the actual status of the company following
November 1977. This mutual mistake was compounded by the action of the Utah Division of
Corporations in requesting and accepting annual renewals for the company post-November 1977.
Plaintiff promptly pursued this claim after he had discovered the mutual mistake that Wilkinson, its
shareholders and the Division of Corporations had made for two and one-half decades.
Plaintiff also believes that this case presents exceptional circumstances which require the
application of the "discovery rule", as indicated by Plaintiffs Affidavit attached hereto. Plaintiffs
mother had no working knowledge of company operations. She was assigned a title in name only.
The day-to-day operations were conducted by S. C. Wilkinson and Lorraine Burdett, both before and
after November 1977. LaVaun Terry had no reason to question corporate status, as apparently, as
indicated above, there was no interruption of corporate existence according to state records and
annual renewals continued.
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT II
[DOCTRINE OF LACHES]
Wilkinson's argument here is that, among other things, Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in
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bringing this action. As indicated above, Plaintiffs only predecessor-in-interest was his mother,
LaVaun Terry. As indicated in Plaintiffs Affidavit, his mother was an officer in name only and had
no actual or direct knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the business and relied solely on
information provided by S. C. Wilkinson and/or Lorraine Burdett for information concerning the
corporation. As indicated in Point I, LaVaun Terry had no knowledge that there was any issue with
regard to the company's corporate status and believed, as likely S. C. Wilkinson and Lorraine
Burdett did, that the corporation was viable, in view of the action (or non action) of the Division of
Corporations in the years following 1977. In summary, there was no "unreasonable delay" in
bringing this action, because there was no discovery until after Mrs. Terry's death in 2001.
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT III
[FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES]
Wilkinson argues that Plaintiff was required to seek administrative review of the Division's
decision to accept belated amendments to Wilkinson's Articles of Incorporation requesting perpetual
existence. This argument is based on the premise cited in Wilkinson's Memorandum, on page 5,
that "The Legislature has empowered the Division to make conclusive determinations as to a
corporation's status", citing present Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128.
Plaintiff acknowledges that, under present Utah statutory law (in effect since 1992), the
Division of Corporations has initial conclusive authority to determine corporate status. Plaintiff also
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acknowledges that, under current statutory law, the Division also has exclusive authority to
administratively dissolve a corporation for, among other things, "because its period of duration has
expired". [Utah Code Annotated. §16-10a-1420(5).]
Wilkinson's argument, under Point III, is based on a couple of false premises, namely: (1)
That Wilkinson was a viable corporation in 2003 when the Division accepted its Amended Articles;
and (2) that the Revised Business Corporation Act, enacted in 1992, applies in this case. On the
contrary, Wilkinson was not a viable corporation in 2003, having suffered "corporate death" after
November 1977 as a matter of law. In addition, the 1992 Revised Act is not the statutory law
applicable in this case, and the Revised Act only applies to corporations "in existence" on July 1,
1992. fSee Utah Code Annotated. §16-10a-1701.] Plaintiff would also note that the 1992 Revised
Act has "savings provisions", saving the operation of prior statutes and rights affixed or accruing
prior to the repeal of former statutes. In summary, this case must be decided by the law in effect in
1977, not 1992. Administrative appeal of the action taken by the Division in 2003 is unnecessary,
based on the statutory and case law in effect in 1977.
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT IV
[DIVISION'S AUTHORITY TO REINSTATE BY ACCEPTING AMENDMENTS]
In its final point, Wilkinson argues that there was a substantive right to reinstate in 2003,
based on the 1972 statute, which allowed two (2) years following expiration for a corporation to file
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amendments extending its duration and seeking reinstatement.
Once again, Defendant compares "apples to oranges". Under the old statute, the Attorney
General's office was required to initiate Court action in order to dissolve corporations that had failed
to comply with administrative procedures or in cases where there were other violations resulting in
"involuntary dissolution". [Utah Code Annotated, 16-10-89 (1972).] Absent from the former statute
was language requiring a Court to pronounce "involuntary dissolution", based upon a corporation's
charter having expired. This supports Plaintiffs argument that the older statute recognized that
corporate status terminates as a matter of law by reason of expiration of charter, without the necessity
of an Attorney General action and Court Order.
Plaintiff would concede that, under the old statute, Wilkinson did apparently have a right,
for two (2) years following its automatic dissolution, to seek reinstatement under the old Utah Code
Annotated, §16-10-100. When it failed to do so within that prescribed time, its right to reinstatement
was lost.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION
As set forth above, neither the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches should preclude
this action, because there was no discovery of the circumstances giving rise to the cause of action
until after LaVaun Terry's death in 2001. This lack of discovery was predicated upon mutual
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mistake, exacerbated by the actions of the Division of Corporations. Administrative appeal is not
required, and Wilkinson's rights of reinstatement was lost after two (2) years following the
expiration of its charter. Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, and
the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $

day of February, 2006.

MICttAEL F. OLMSTEAD
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs
Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings to H. THOMAS STEVENSON,
Attorney for Defendant, WILKM^ON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 3986 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah, 84403, this / / ^ V d a v of February, 2006.
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MICHAEL P. OLMSTBAD £2455]
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 625-0960
Facsimile (801)621-0035

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DONALD E. TERRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY and
UTAH STATB DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS &
COMMERCIAL CODE,

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD E. TERRY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION
TO CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Civil No. 030906753
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS &
COMMERCIAL CODE,
Third-Party Defendant.

Judge MICHAEL D. LYON
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Affidavit of Donald Ex Teny in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Cross-Motion for
Summazy Judgment
Civil No. 030906753

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)
)$$.

COUNTYOF

.)

DONALD E, TERRY, upon oath, deposes and says:
L

I am the Plaintiff above-named, and I am familiar with the facts and circumstances

stated herein.
2.

My only predecessor-in-interest to the ownership interest in question was my mother,

LaVaun W. Teny. Mrs. Teny became deceased on May 26,2001.
3.

At the time of her death, LaVaun W. Terry owned two (2) of approximately forty

(40) shares of stock that had been issued by Wilkinson Farm Service Corporation. Affiant inherited
one (1) of those two (2) shares as a result of his mother's death, the other share being distributed to
Affiant's sister.
4.

LaVaun W. Terry did not inherit stockfromS. C. Wilkinson but instead, had owned,

at one time, sixteen (16) shares in Wilkinson in her own right. She had transferredfourteen(14) of
those sixteen (16) shares back to the corporation and/or Lorraine Burdett in the late 1970s and early
1980s. (See letterfromLorraine Burdett to Affiant, dated June 12,2001, referencing the purchase
of LaVaun W. Terry's stock.)
5.

Though she owned a substantial interest in Wilkinson* LaVaun W> Terry, during her

lifetime, was not actively engaged in the day-to-day business, as an officer or director, and relied,
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instead, on information provided by its president, Samuel C. Wilkinson (LaVaun W. Terry's father),
and its long-time secretary, Lorraine Buxdett (LaVaun W. Terry's sister), who then became
Wilkinson's president, after Samuel C. Wilkinson's death in 1981.
6.

My mother, LaVaun W. Terry, was a corporate officer, in name only, and repeatedly

complained to me over a period of forty (40) years about not being privy to the workings of the
corporation. To my knowledge, there were no actual annual meetings of shareholders, officers and
directors, where my mother participated in discussing the business of the corporation, including its
corporate status,
7,

My mother, during her lifetime, understood and believed that Wilkinson was a lawful

corporation.
Further, Affiant sqyeth naught
DATED and signed this \ ^ ^ d a v of December, 2005.

DONALD E.TCR^^^ntiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /^JAsiy

^ ^ A
ETSUKOEICHER
Commission # 152D841 I
Notary Public - California
|
San Diego County
I
My Comm. Expires Oct 21 > 2008f
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